How has the United States Contributed to the ‘Ruination’ of Yemen?

Research

How has the United States Contributed to the ‘Ruination’ of Yemen?

SIS professor Jeff Bachman answers a few questions about his recent research on the impact of US and coalition violence in Yemen.

Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the Middle East, has been enmeshed in fighting and conflict for over 10 years. A civil war turned proxy war, Saudi Arabia and Iran support the two opposing sides, which has brought significant violence and hardship to Yemen. The country is now facing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

A new article from SIS professor Jeff Bachman for an upcoming special issue of Middle East Critique explores how the US contributed to the “ruination” of Yemen through drone strikes and support for Saudi-led coalition bombing. To learn more, we asked Bachman some questions about the impact of the violence in Yemen, what the US’s role has been across presidential administrations, and what’s next for his research.

As a genocide scholar, what led you to focus your research and this article on Yemen?: A few things led me to focus my research on Yemen. First, I had already been focusing on Yemen because the United States was using drones and, with them, killing children, women, and men who had nothing to do with al-Qaeda. Then, when the Saudi-led coalition began its bombing of Yemen in March 2025, I soon noticed that the bombing, combined with the blockade, was impacting Yemenis physically, mentally, and culturally, including by killing and starving Yemenis, causing Yemenis to die from preventable disease, destroying medical facilities and other civilian infrastructures, and damaging and destroying irreplaceable cultural heritage. Borrowing from Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term “genocide” and tirelessly lobbied for an international treaty banning genocide, I described the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing and blockade of Yemen as a “synchronized attack” on Yemeni life. Notably, the Saudi-led coalition has been able to commit its violence against Yemenis thanks to the complicit material and political support of the United States.
What do you mean by the “ruination” of Yemen, and how has the United States contributed to that?: is part of a forthcoming special issue of Middle East Critique on “The Impossibility of Stability: What to Make of the Ruination of Yemen.” I was invited to reflect and expand on my previous research on Yemen. So, my use of “ruination” in the title of my article is largely a reflection of the theme of the special issue; however, it is also undeniably applicable based on the physical, biological, and cultural impacts of US and coalition violence, and because of the unbroken chain of US violence via drone strikes and the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing��and blockade of Yemen with US political and material support. At minimum, the United States has killed many hundreds of Yemenis with drone and other air strikes. I say at minimum because the United States has used creative “accounting” practices in how it counts “militants” killed and civilians killed; essentially, all “military-age males” killed, which may include boys as young as 12 years old, have been counted as “militants” unless proven not to be posthumously.; Since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing of Yemen, the United States has armed coalition members, with most members having received more than $1 billion in US arms sales since 2015. During President Obama’s time in office, Saudi Arabia received 42 separate deals, totaling $115 billion. Between 2016 and 2024, spanning the last year of Obama’s second term, President Trump’s first term, and President Biden’s term, arms sales for coalition members combined to reach more than $141 billion. The United States has also aided the coalition by providing fuel and mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, and intelligence, as well as expedited munitions resupply and maintenance and other technical support.
How has US policy—and the implications for the Yemeni people—been similar or different across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations?: Each administration made an attention-grabbing policy shift that had little value for the safety and security of Yemenis. Though coalition bombing began in March 2015, the Obama administration waited until December 2016, during the last few weeks in office, to suspend the sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia, which, of course, was only one coalition member—and not the only member launching air strikes in Yemen.; In November 2018, the Trump administration ended the practice of providing mid-air refueling of coalition aircraft. While this may have made it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to engage in some airstrikes, the same cannot be said for the United Arab Emirates, whose strikes were launched from nearby Eritrea until the base was dismantled in 2021.; Then, in 2021, the Biden administration announced it would halt support for the coalition’s “offensive operations in Yemen.” Yet, , “the Saudi-led war on Yemen by definition, is an offensive operation,” including the blockade.
Did your findings with this article lead you to any new research questions? What’s next for your research?: Esther Brito, my research collaborator and SIS PhD student, and I have a paper that we are working on that develops a typology of rhetorical strategies used by the United States to deflect shared responsibility for the violence committed by others with US support. Support for the Saudi-led coalition is one of the four cases we use to identify these strategies. Beyond that, I have a few things I’m currently working on. First, I am co-editing a Routledge Handbook of Genocide Studies, which should come out early 2026. I am also writing an introductory text on genocide titled Harry Potter and Genocide, which will use the world of Harry Potter to introduce readers to traditional and emerging concepts relating to genocide. Finally, I’m working on a new project that will involve analysis of US secondary education curricula and texts for their coverage of historical violence committed by others with US support.

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